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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 











JOHN YOST, Warden, FCI Loretto; MICHAEL STEWART, Associate 
Warden, FCI Loretto; JACK MARQUIS, Supervisor of Education, FCI Loretto; 
DOUG AUMAN, Unit Manager, FCI Loretto; CHRIS BRODMERKEL, Case 
Manager, FCI Loretto; BRYCE BURGET, Case Manager Coordinator, FCI Loretto;  
MARIA BLANCA RODRIGUEZ-SCHRAMM; BIRGET; O‟DONNELL; SMOGYE 
____________________________________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(D.C. Civil No. 3:11-cv-00013) 
District Judge:  Honorable Kim R. Gibson 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted for Possible Dismissal Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) 
or Summary Action Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 27.4 and I.O.P. 10.6 
December 13, 2012 
 
Before:  SCIRICA, HARDIMAN and GREENAWAY, JR., Circuit Judges 
 













 Wilson Gorrell, a federal inmate currently incarcerated at FCI Jesup in Jesup, 
Georgia and proceeding pro se, appeals from an order of the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania dismissing with prejudice his complaint 
pursuant to Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Fed. Bur. of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 
388 (1971).  Because this appeal does not present a substantial question, we will 
summarily affirm the District Court‟s order.  See 3d Cir. L.A.R. 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6. 
I. 
 Because we write primarily for the parties, we need only recite the facts necessary 
for our discussion.  In submissions to the District Court, Gorrell alleges that while 
incarcerated at FCI Loretto in Loretto, Pennsylvania, Associate Warden Stewart and 
Supervisor Marquis, under Warden Yost‟s supervision, had his prison work assignment 
as an orderly changed from morning watch to day watch in retaliation for his 
administrative grievances complaining about the policy governing access to the law 
library bathroom.  According to Gorrell, this change limited the amount of time he could 
use to access the law library.  He further asserts that after he filed an administrative tort 
claim challenging the renewal of his Management Variable (“MGTV”) of Greater 
Security, various staff members conspired to have the MGTV reapplied to his case and to 
have him transferred to FCI Jesup in retaliation for filing his claim.  Gorrell also claims 
that he was transferred to interfere with his ability to litigate his habeas petition filed 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2241.  Finally, Gorrell alleges that after his transfer to FCI Jesup, 
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mailroom staff at FCI Loretto opened his legal mail and failed to forward it to him or 
withheld his mail from him completely.  Gorrell also asserts that these actions violated 
his Fifth Amendment due process rights and his Eighth Amendment right to be free from 
arbitrary punishment. 
 Gorrell filed his Bivens complaint on January 14, 2011 and subsequently filed a 
supplemental complaint detailing his legal mail claim on May 16, 2011.  Appellees filed 
motions to dismiss on September 19, 2011 and October 25, 2011.  On July 18, 2012, a 
Magistrate Judge recommended that the motions to dismiss be granted and that Gorrell‟s 
complaint be dismissed without further leave to amend.  On August 13, 2012, the District 
Court adopted the Magistrate Judge‟s recommendation and dismissed Gorrell‟s 
complaint.  Gorrell then timely filed his notice of appeal. 
II. 
 We have jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and exercise 
plenary review over the District Court‟s dismissal order.  See Allah v. Seiverling, 229 
F.3d 220, 223 (3d Cir. 2000).  To survive dismissal, “a complaint must contain sufficient 
factual matter, accepted as true, to „state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.‟”  
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 
550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)).  We look for “„enough facts to raise a reasonable expectation 
that discovery will reveal evidence of‟ the necessary elements” of a claim for relief.  
Phillips v. Cnty. of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 234 (3d Cir. 2008) (quoting Twombly, 550 
U.S. at 556).  “A Bivens action, which is the federal equivalent of the § 1983 cause of 
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action against state actors, will lie where the defendant has violated the plaintiff‟s rights 
under color of federal law.”  Brown v. Philip Morris Inc., 250 F.3d 789, 800 (3d Cir. 
2001). We may summarily affirm on any basis supported by the record.  Murray v. 
Bledsoe, 650 F.3d 246, 247 (3d Cir. 2011) (per curiam). 
III. 
 Gorrell first asserts two separate claims of retaliation in his complaint.  He alleges 
that staff at FCI Loretto retaliated against him for filing administrative grievances by 
changing his work assignment from morning watch to day watch.  Second, he argues that 
staff retaliated against him for filing an administrative tort claim by reapplying the 
MGTV designation to his case and transferring him to FCI Jesup.
1
 
 To sustain a retaliation claim under Bivens, an inmate must demonstrate that (1) 
he engaged in constitutionally protected conduct; (2) he suffered adverse action; and (3) 
the constitutionally protected conduct was “a substantial or motivating factor” for the 
adverse response.  See Carter v. McGrady, 292 F.3d 152, 157-58 (3d Cir. 2002); see also 
Rauser v. Horn, 241 F.3d 330, 333 (3d Cir. 2001).  With respect to the required causal 
link, if the prisoner makes a prima facie showing that his constitutionally protected 
conduct was a motivating factor in the decision to discipline, the defendant then has the 
                                              
1
 Although the defendants argued that Gorrell had failed to exhaust his administrative 
remedies for this claim, the District Court chose to dismiss his claim without resolving 
the issue of exhaustion.  See 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c)(2); Nyhuis v. Reno, 204 F.3d 65, 69 
n.4 (3d Cir. 2000) (stating that exhaustion under the Prison Litigation Reform Act 
(“PLRA”) is not a jurisdictional requirement). 
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burden of showing that the same disciplinary action would have been taken even in the 
absence of the protected activity.  See Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334. 
While Gorrell‟s litigation activities qualify as protected conduct, see Milhouse v. 
Carlson, 652 F.3d 371, 373-74 (3d Cir. 1981), we agree with the District Court that he 
has failed to allege a prima facie case of retaliation for either of his claims.  He retained 
the ability to access the law library during evenings and weekends after his work 
assignment change to day watch.  The fact that Gorrell was able to file not only 
administrative grievances but his § 2241 petition after being assigned to day watch 
demonstrates that the shift “was [not] sufficient to deter [him] from exercising his 
[constitutional] rights.”  Allah, 229 F.3d at 225 (alterations in original) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).   
Furthermore, evidence in the record establishes that staff at FCI Loretto requested 
approval to renew Gorrell‟s MGTV in August 2008, approximately five months before he 
filed his administrative tort claim.  On December 18, 2009—after Gorrell had already 
filed his tort claim—staff at FCI Loretto requested a lesser security transfer to FCI 
Morgantown for Gorrell because of his good adjustment to FCI Loretto and participation 
in programs.  However, the Bureau of Prisons‟ Designation and Sentence Computation 
Center (“DSCC”) declined to follow FCI Loretto‟s recommendation and reapplied the 
MGTV because of Gorrell‟s history of absconding from bail.  Staff at FCI Jesup then 
requested a renewal of the MGTV, which was approved by the DSCC. Additionally, 
Gorrell‟s tort claim was not referred to FCI Loretto for investigation until February 24, 
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2010.  While reapplication of the MGTV can be construed as adverse action because it 
prevented Gorrell from being transferred to a lesser security facility, the record 
establishes that staff at FCI Loretto did not request reapplication of the MGTV because of 
Gorrell‟s administrative tort claim.  Instead, this action would have been taken even if 
Gorrell had not filed his claim, see Rauser, 241 F.3d at 334; therefore, the District Court 
appropriately dismissed this claim. 
 Next, Gorrell asserts that his right to access the courts was violated because he 
was transferred to FCI Jesup to interfere with his ability to litigate his § 2241 petition.
2
  
To establish a cognizable access to the courts claim, a prisoner must demonstrate that he 
has suffered an actual injury to his ability to present a claim.  Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 
343, 352-54 (1996).  Moreover, the claim must relate to either a direct or collateral 
challenge to the prisoner‟s sentence or conditions of confinement.  Id. at 355 
(“Impairment of any other litigating capacity is simply one of the incidental . . . 
consequences of conviction and incarceration.”).  However, “when the Government 
moves a habeas petitioner after she properly files a petition naming her immediate 
custodian, the District Court retains jurisdiction and may direct the writ to any respondent 
within its jurisdiction who has legal authority to effectuate the prisoner‟s release.”  
Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 441 (2004).  While Gorrell‟s § 2241 petition was 
eventually dismissed, he did not lose the ability to litigate his petition after his transfer 
                                              
2
 Again, although the defendants argued that Gorrell had not exhausted this claim, the 
District Court chose not to address the issue of exhaustion. 
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because he was able to file a reply and other correspondence.  Accordingly, because the 
District Court retained jurisdiction over Gorrell‟s § 2241 petition, it properly dismissed 
this claim. 
 In his supplemental complaint, Gorrell claims that after his transfer to FCI Jesup, 
mailroom staff at FCI Loretto interfered with his legal mail by either deliberately 
withholding it or opening it and failing to forward it to him.  To establish liability under § 
1983, each individual defendant „must have personal involvement in the alleged 
wrongdoing.‟”  Evancho v. Fisher, 423 F.3d 347, 353 (3d Cir. 2005) (quoting Rode v. 
Dellarciprete, 845 F.2d 1195, 1207 (3d Cir. 1988)).  “Personal involvement can be shown 
through allegations of personal direction or of actual knowledge and acquiescence.”  
Rode, 845 F.2d at 1207.  These allegations must be made with appropriate particularity.  
Id.  Although Gorrell names mailroom officers Birget, O‟Donnell, and Smogye as 
defendants, nothing in the record shows that they personally committed the alleged acts.  
Gorrell asserts that they are responsible for the daily operations of the mailroom; 
however, this is insufficient to establish personal liability.  Accordingly, the District 
Court properly dismissed Gorrell‟s claim regarding his mail. 
 Finally, Gorrell asserts that his job assignment shift, the reapplication of the 
MGTV designation, and his transfer violated his Fifth Amendment due process and 
Eighth Amendment rights.  While certain fundamental rights are protected by due 
process, see White v. Napoleon, 897 F.2d 103, 111 (3d Cir. 1990), “[p]risoners have no 
constitutional right to . . . jobs,” Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 348 (1981).  
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Accordingly, Gorrell had no constitutional right to remain in his morning watch 
assignment.  Furthermore, Gorrell has no constitutionally protected liberty interest under 
due process in prison transfers.  See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245-48 (1983).  
Finally, the Eighth Amendment is inapplicable to Gorrell‟s claims because he has not 
suffered any interference with his health or basic needs.  See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 
U.S. 825, 834 (1994). 
IV. 
For the foregoing reasons, no substantial question is presented and we will affirm 
the judgment of the District Court.
3
  See 3d Cir. L.A.R 27.4; I.O.P. 10.6.  Accordingly, 
we grant Appellees‟ motion for summary action. 
                                              
3
 The District Court did not provide Gorrell leave to amend his complaint before 
dismissing it with prejudice.  We conclude that the District Court did not err in declining 
to allow Gorrell an opportunity to amend because we do not see how any amendment to 
his complaint would save his claims.  See Grayson v. Mayview State Hosp., 293 F.3d 
103, 114 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that courts should not dismiss pro se complaints without 
granting leave to amend unless “amendment would be inequitable or futile”). 
